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rT _HE STUDY of U.S. arms transfers and their impact on the fiscal 
decisions of aid recipients has been the subject of various in- 
terpretations and competing explanations. Absent in this litera- 
ture has been a systematic testing of propositions derived from a general 
theory of aid impacts. A larger and somewhat related body of research has 
examined the political (Chaudhuri 1972; Hughes 1967; Gutteridge 1967) 
and general economic effects of domestic military spending (Deger and 
Smith 1983; Smith 1977, 1980; Benoit 1978; Kennedy 1974; Whynes 
1979). These studies, however, have not examined the fiscal impact of 
foreign military assistance. To date only a few researchers have studied 
this issue in any systematic fashion (McGuire 1979, 1982; Wolf 1971). In 
this study we seek to fill this gap by applying grant economics theory 
(Pigou 1932; Oates 1972) to study the fiscal impact of U.S. military arms 
transfers on foreign nations. Drawing on the domestic aid literature 
(Oates 1972; Gramlich 1972), we identify a set of propositions concerning 
the expenditure decisions of domestic aid recipients, and test these prop- 
ositions against the fiscal behavior of Military Assistance Program (MAP) 
recipients between 1967-1976. In addition to the substantive import of 
this question and its bearing on the implementation of U.S. foreign policy, 
this research provides a unique opportunity to test the applicability of 
domestic aid theory to the study of foreign aid policy. 
THE PURPOSES OF MILITARY AID 
Although a number of rationales have been advanced for the use of 
military aid, we discern three general categories or justifications for be- 
stowing it. 
The first category is direct enhancement of U.S. national security. Aid 
is given to build up the military power of other nations, particularly allies, 
so that they can more effectively handle threats to their security, threats 
that the U.S. government believes that it would have to counter if the 
recipient nation could not. 
The second category is indirect enhancement of U.S. national secu- 
rity. Aid is given because another government implicitly or explicitly 
requests it. U.S. decision-makers may not believe that our security (or that 
of the requesting nation) actually requires the infusion of military goods. 
But the aid is used to barter concessions from the recipient nation. 
NOTE: An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1983 Annual Meetings of the 
Southern Political Science Association. We wish to thank Professor Rick Wilson for 
careful reading of the manuscript. Responsibility for all errors however, lies with the 
authors. 
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The third reason for giving aid has little to do with international 
problems, and much to do with domestic problems. Giving aid may result 
in larger production runs for equipment, dramatically reducing the unit 
cost of items, and therefore lowering the bill for the U.S. military (Ham- 
mond et al. 1983: 64). Further, equipment for foreign countries can be 
used to keep U.S. production lines "warm." A final justification for U.S. 
military aid rests with domestic political and economic interests. Various 
interest groups may apply pressure to the U.S. government to give away 
arms or training, and the government may bow to these pressures, for 
reasons that have nothing to do with foreign or defense policy (Asher 
1961). 
The distinctions among these three categories are conceptual; the U.S. 
government may transfer a particular grant for a combination of the 
motivations described above. Regardless of the motivation behind U.S. 
military assistance, there is always a specific fiscal impact associated with 
the receipt of any aid transfer. Under some conditions, these fiscal im- 
pacts may work at cross-purposes to U.S. objectives. Maintaining the 
military and political security of an aid recipient might be undermined if 
the fiscal effect of the aid transfer esults in overstimulating the recipient's 
economy. Moreover, aid transfers may affect the recipient's allocation of 
own-source revenues, disturbing sensitive political agreements over 
budget priorities. The importance of understanding the fiscal impact of 
military assistance is underscored by recent U.S. aid efforts. As noted, 
much of this recent aid (including the time period studied here) goes to 
developing countries with fragile economic and political systems, and 
growing international debt problems. Any fiscal impact in these countries 
may have important consequences for the stability of the recipient nation. 
Bearing in mind these aid objectives, let us now turn to a quick look at the 
history of U.S. military assistance. 
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE 
U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
Explanations of aid impacts suggest that the goals and purposes of 
U.S. foreign policy have changed over time, and that this implies a change 
in the type of nation that has been the recipient of U.S. military assistance. 
In the immediate post-World War II period, military aid was closely tied 
to the perceived direct communist threat to America and its allies. The 
distribution of aid was necessarily skewed to western European and some 
Southeast Asian nations; i.e., those nations that directly abutted com- 
munist nations and/or provided convenient locations for U.S. military 
bases. The rationale for this policy and its expected impact was contain- 
ment of Soviet and Chinese ambitions for territorial expansion. Little else 
in terms of U.S. domestic policy or changes in the internal policies of aid 
recipients was expected or intended. Aid recipients during this period 
were strong allies of the U.S. and as such had a mutual interest in 
curtailing communist expansion. The analysis of aid impacts during this 
early period is unambiguous and straightforward: direct U.S. military 
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presence or extensive arms and military aid transfers to contain a nearby, 
external communist threat. 
As time wore on, there was a significant shift in the character and thus 
potential impact of U.S. military aid policy. The economies of our western 
European allies and Japan developed, and their needs for military assis- 
tance declined, as a greater percentage of their military outlays were 
financed from own-source revenues. Between 1950 and 1980 there was a 
dramatic shift in the regional distribution of U.S. military assistance from 
"Europe to East Asia and the Pacific, and finally to the Near East and 
South Asia, reflecting changes in the U.S. Government perceptions of 
threat to its vital interests over the last three decades" (Hammond et al. 
1983: 161-62). 
Five important changes in the composition of MAP recipients oc- 
curred between the immediate post-World War II period, and the period 
under study (1967-1976): 
(1) Developing nations, mainly in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, 
replaced European and other developed nations as the dominant MAP 
recipients. 
(2) The internal politics of these new MAP recipients were extremely 
unstable with frequent changes in ruling regimes and serious challenges 
to the nation's political system. 
(3) The communist threat to new MAP recipients was largely internal, 
rather than an external threat posed by a bordering communist nation. 
Insurgent groups in these nations were increasingly viewed as having 
strong nationalist and anti-colonialist elements rather than being simply 
committed Communists or Marxists. This made it difficult for U.S. 
strategists to promote their military aid programs on exclusively anti- 
communist/containment grounds. 
(4) U.S. relations with developing MAP recipients were less stable and 
more dependent on the ruling regime rather than long term ties of shared 
global interests. 
(5) Associated with these changes in the character of MAP recipients 
and world affairs in general (i.e., the cold war) was a new perspective on 
the origin and maintenance of political stability. Analysts during this 
period (Lerner 1958) came to believe that economic development was 
closely tied to the political stability of a nation and its ability to resist 
internal and external threats to its national security. Thus, securing a 
nation's military capabilities to resist military challenges was only a 
short-term solution to achieving national security. Economic develop- 
ment and its associated by-products (i.e., literacy, system support, and 
income redistribution) were viewed as the long-term solution to the secu- 
rity problems of MAP recipients. 
One additional problem facing these developing nations is their inter- 
national debt obligation. If the national security of these nations is so 
threatened that they must spend a disproportionate amount of their GNP 
on military preparedness, little will be left with which to stimulate eco- 
nomic development. One potential role for U.S. arms transfers during the 
1967-1976 period may have been to provide the opportunity to achieve 
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the twin goals of economic development and short-term military security. 
MAP recipients would be able to substitute U.S. military assistance for 
their own military outlays, thus freeing monies for other domestic (private 
and/or public sector) needs (e.g., health, welfare, education, capital 
construction). 
THE FISCAL IMPACT OF U.S. MILITARY AID PROGRAMS 
The empirical questions raised by MAP policy are whether: (1) U.S. 
arms transfers relieved the recipient nation's military outlays. 
(2) increased the percent of own-source spending on non-military pro- 
grams without (3) overstimulating the national government's outlays to 
the point of economic insolvency (e.g., high rates of inflation and ban- 
kruptcy). These empirical questions have been addressed before by re- 
searchers studying domestic aid transfers and aid recipient behavior in 
the U.S., and this body of theory and empirical work is employed in 
accounting for foreign aid impacts. 
Pigou (1932), Oates (1972), and Gramlich (1972) have identified three 
potential fiscal responses to aid transfers: (1) Additive: The aid transfer 
adds to the policy expenditures of the recipient in the funded policy area. 
The grant does not however, increase the recipient's financial contribu- 
tion to this or other programs. (2) Stimulative: Here recipient expendi- 
tures on the aided activity increase above what would have been spent in 
the absence of the aid transfer. (3) Substitutive: Aid transfers replace 
recipient expenditures on the aided activity, freeing these monies to be 
spent on unaided activities including revenue (i.e., tax) cuts. 
Figure 1 depicts the hypothesized effects of an aid transfer. The 
vertical axis represents the level of recipient expenditure for all programs 
and activities excluding the aided function - the military. The horizontal 
axis represents recipient expenditures for the aided activity. Line AB is 
the budget constraint for a given nation and expresses the relationship 
between military outlays and all other government spending. Point C is 
the optimal mix of military and all other expenditures given existing 
preferences in the nation - utility function I. If the provision of U.S. 
military assistance moves the intersection of the budget constraint line 
(AB) and the nation's utility function to a point on or to the left of line CD, 
a condition of perfect program substitution prevails. Here, one dollar of 
U.S. aid reduces recipient military spending by an equal amount, shifting 
these monies to other domestic programs or tax cuts. 
The effect of U.S. aid transfers is partially substitutive if the receipt of 
assistance moves C to a point within DCE (e.g., point H). Every additional 
dollar of aid would result in some fraction of each recipient military dollar 
outlay being spent on non-military programs. An additive condition is 
indicated by the movement of C to a point on CE (e.g., G). Here every 
dollar awarded to the recipient goes directly toward increased military 
spending. Under this condition, U.S. assistance has no fiscal impact on the 
nation, either in terms of revenues or spending. The budget constraint 
merely moves outward from the origin, parallel to the original budget 
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constraint (KI). Finally, if the provision of U.S. assistance moves the 
budget constraint line to a position within BCE (point F), a stimulative 
condition is identified. Here recipient expenditures for military programs 
are increased above the level of MAP assistance and previous recipient 
military expenditures. 
A review of empirical studies of U.S. domestic aid transfers (Gramlich, 
1972) suggests that fiscal responses of aid recipients (i.e., stimulation, 
substitution or additivity) vary with the nature of the aid delivery 
mechanism (i.e., conditional vs. nonconditional), recipient efforts to resist 
donor policy initiatives, and the elasticity of demand for the funded 
activity. Conditional grants often carry matching and/or maintenance of 
effort requirements increasing and stimulative effect these mechanisms 
have on recipient spending. 
MAP monies are distributed through equipment transfers, and 
training. They carry few if any specific conditions and requirements for 
the disbursement of these aid awards within the recipient nation. Under 
these conditions it is likely that aid recipients will at least partially substi- 
tute U.S. assistance for some portion of their own contribution to military 
programs. 
Demand for military equipment, personnel and other related ex- 
penses is thought to be inelastic (except in case of hostilities), and thus not 
linearly related to U.S assistance, either positively (stimulative effect) or 
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negatively (substitutive ffect). We expect that the rate at which aid reci- 
pients substitute MAP monies for own-source military spending to di- 
minish with higher levels of aid assistance. 
Stein (1979, 1981) has shown that there are significant costs associated 
with seeking and receiving domestic aid assistance which are not generally 
covered by the aid award (i.e., application, administrative and opportu- 
nity costs). These costs increase the likelihood that recipients will substi- 
tute aid monies for own-source monies in order to recoup grantsmenship 
costs. Moreover, these recipients are not assured of continued U.S. fund- 
ing, and thus may not want to pursue an expansion of military programs, 
since they will not be able to maintain them without U.S. military assis- 
tance.1 McGuire's (1982) study of U.S. aid to Israel shows that a consider- 
able amount of assistance ends up spent on non-military programs. 
McGuire estimated that between 9 and 30 percent of U.S. aid given to 
Israel between 1960 and 1980 was used to fund non-military programs in 
both the private and public sector. This finding is particularly significant 
since Israel, unlike most U.S. aid recipients, has been under a constant 
state of military preparedness during this time period. This condition 
should have actually lessened the degree of substitution. Our own expec- 
tation is that countries actively engaged in military conflicts will have less 
of an incentive to substitute military aid for own-source spending than 
nations not engaged in military conflict. 
In the next section, we will operationalize the concepts and ideas 
outlined here, and determine if the findings about domestic aid impacts 
on local governments will also hold true for military aid recipients. 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
We begin by discussing the variable definitions and data sources used, 
and follow by indicating the hypotheses tested. 
Dependent Variables 
For comparability, data on MAP recipient's own-source military ex- 
penditures are taken from a collection supplied by the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency (ACDA) for the years 1967-1976.2 The unit of 
observation for analysis is the country year (i.e., each case is one country in 
'The applicability of our domestic grant impact model to the foreign aid setting raises an 
obvious problem of comparability. The fiscal behavior of MAP recipients is subject to 
different influences than the spending behavior of domestic U.S. aid recipients (i.e., 
state and local governments). This potential constraint on the use of our fiscal impact 
model is not problematic for this study. We make no case for the comparability between 
U.S. domestic and foreign aid recipients. Rather, we suggest that there is a strong basis 
to believe that grant recipients in any setting have similiar inclinations for the use of 
external funding. In this regard we are merely making a case for a rational choice view 
of the foreign aid system; that the recipient seeks to avoid compliance with donor 
preferences in order to maximize its own preferences. 
2The data for this time period are the most recent MAP figures available to researchers. 
They also cover the period when American military aid and involvement in Southeast 
Asia were greatest, providing a suitable test for the conflict hypothesis. 
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a single year) allowing for a maximum of ten cases per country. The 
primary dependent variable is the ratio of own source military expendi- 
tures in a year divided by the total central government expenditures in the 
same year (MILEXCEN). This measure allows us to identify the budget- 
ary importance of military expenditures to the central government. All 
expenditures are in 1975 constant dollars.3 
We will also look at the impact of military aid on the size of total central 
government expenditures. This variable is simply the denominator of the 
indicator just discussed (CENGVEXP), and is available from ACDA data. 
Finally, two major components of social welfare expenditures will be 
examined, central government expenditures for health (HELTHCEN), 
and for education (EDCEN), in order. 
Independent Variables 
The best collection of U.S. military grants-in-aid data is the Defense 
Security Assistance Agency's (DSAA) Fiscal Series. The 1982 edition was 
used for this analysis. Yearly figures for Military Assistance Program 
(MAP), MAP excess defense articles, and International Military Educa- 
tion and Training Programs (IMET) are available. MAP consists of milit- 
ary equipment, materials, and services minus the costs of training. MAP 
excess defense articles consist of equipment beyond the needs of the U.S. 
Defense Department. IMET consists of the dollar amounts spent on 
military training. All three are a grants-in-aid, the major difference being 
that they represent three separate accounting categories; therefore, the 
total sum for all three (AID) is used as the major independent variable of 
this study. AID is measured in constant 1975 dollars. 
The figures given by DSAA are also divided into two sub-categories: 
Program and Delivery. "Program" is that dollar amount of material and 
services allocated to a particular country by the DSAA through the De- 
fense Department. "Delivery" is that dollar amount of material and ser- 
vices received by or "in route" to the country. Given that budgets must be 
made up before the money is spent, we decided that the best test of a link 
between military grant-in-aid and recipient expenditures would be the 
relationship between the programmed military aid allocation at time t-1 
and the recipient's budget at time t. Our reasoning was that year t's budget 
would be made up in year t-1. Therefore, the actual amount of aid 
delivered in year t could not have an impact on the budgetary process; the 
figure that the central government would have available for planning 
purposes for the budget would be the programmed deliveries for the next 
year. 
One major problem researchers confront when studying U.S. foreign 
military assistance is the difficulty in obtaining reliable and valid data on 
arms transfers. There are at least three other major data sources on U.S. 
military assistance which we have chosen not to incorporate in our mea- 
sure of U.S. military transfers: the Foreign Military Sales Program (FMS), 
the Military Assistance Service Fund (MASF), and Security-Supporting 
3Data were deflated using a national GNP deflator. 
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Assistance (SSA). Given the scope of our study, we have chosen to limit 
our examination of arms transfers to those programs which most ap- 
proximate a grant delivery mechanism. At least two of these programs 
(MASF and FMS) do not fall into this category, and thus are not appropri- 
ate for testing our main hypothesis. Only when FMS are financed through 
a number of U.S. credit programs (e.g., Department of Defense Guaran- 
teed Credit, Direct Credit, or Waived Credit) do they approach the 
character of a grant. Hammond et al. (1983) identify another problem 
with the FMS program. They note there is a wide discrepancy between 
sales under FMS and the actual delivery of arms and other materials. 
Without specific data on actual deliveries, the utility of FMS data for our 
purposes is greatly diminished. 
The SSA program is an economic assistance program, and is not 
directly concerned with maintaining the military preparedness of the 
recipient nation. SSA, however, is intended to "provide economic assis- 
tance to countries whose economies were heavily burdened by defense 
costs" (Hammond et al. 1983: 126). Though the intent of this program 
actually conforms closely to our model of military aid impacts, it is not a 
military assistance program and thus cannot be used for testing our main 
hypotheses. 
MASF outlays originated in 1966 to aid South Vietnam and three 
other Southeast Asian countries (Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand) par- 
ticipating in the Vietnam War. By 1975 and coinciding with the end of 
American military presence in Southeast Asia, MASF outlays to these 
countries were transfered to MAP. The separation of military aid to major 
Vietnam War participants from MAP outlays may distort our measure of 
U.S. military assistance and the estimation of our model, especially for 
combatant nation years. Our original thinking was to exclude MASF 
outlays since they constituted a direct American military involvement 
rather than the provision of assistance to a combatant nation. However, 
we conducted our analysis with MASF outlays included, and excluded. 
Given the few nation years effected by this change, it is not surprising that 
the results with MASF included are not different from those obtained 
with MASF excluded from our measure of aid transfers. The results 
reported below exclude MASF outlays. Since these monies were available 
to only a small number of Vietnam era combatants, their exclusion only 
strengthens our ability to generalize from our findings, and does not 
introduce any empirical bias to either our measure of aid transfers, or 
estimates of aid impacts. 
Control Variable 
There are certainly factors other than military grant-in-aid that can 
have an impact on a nation's budgetary behavior. In the case of the 
military budget, one might expect that threats to national security will 
strongly influence both the level of military expenditures, and its propor- 
tion of central government expenditures. If the level of threat perceived 
by the government is high, then the military budget may not be responsive 
to U.S. military aid (i.e., will not exhibit the expected substitutional be- 
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havior). To control for this possibility, we operationalized threat to na- 
tional security as the involvement of a nation in an international or civil 
war. Singer and Small's (1982) data collection is used to create a dummy 
variable (CONFLICT) coded 1 in each year that a country was involved in 
an interstate or a civil war.4 
Hypotheses 
If a substitution effect exists, then we expect that monies normally 
spent on the military budget will be diverted to other areas of the central 
government budget. This diversion may take two paths. First, the monies 
may be channeled to other areas of the budget that are designed to 
improve the domestic social situation via better health conditions and 
services, and higher levels of education. This positive relationshp between 
military aid and social expenditures should increase at decreasing rates, as 
some threshold of substitution in the military budget is reached. A second 
path open to these countries is to substitute military aid for own-source 
military expenditures, and return the substituted portion of their military 
budget back to the private sector in the form of tax cuts, and/or increased 
tax deductions. The exact return mechanism used by a government is 
beyond the scope of this study, but we can test for the expected general 
decline in total government expenditures that coincides with the increase 
of U.S. military grant-in-aid. This relationship can be expected to de- 
crease at increasingly decreasing rates, as a threshold for substitution is 
reached in the military budget of the recipient (i.e., we do not expect to 
find that a government relies totally on grant-in-aid instead of any own- 
source military expenditures). 
Three specific hypotheses are tested: 
H 1: The greater the amount of U.S. military grant-in-aid, the lower 
the level of recipient nation military expenditures. This substitution 
should occur at decreasing rates, as the amount of grant-in-aid increases. 
H2: The greater the amount of U.S. military grant-in-aid, the greater 
the level of recipient nation social welfare expenditures. This substitution 
should occur at decreasing rates, as the amount of grant-in-aid increases. 
H3: The greater the amount of U.S. military grant-in-aid, the lower 
the level of recipient nation total central government expenditures. This 
substitution should occur at decreasing rates, as the amount of grant-in- 
aid increases. 
We do not expect to observe these substitution effects if the recipient 
nation is involved in a conflict; in this situation, we anticipate MAP monies 
4Threats to national security are often highly subjective. The data used in this paper for 
coding the presence or absence of this threat obviously do not cover those perceived 
threats if they do not produce battle deaths. Measures of this type of national security 
threat may be pursued through the use of data from the Correlates of War Project on 
serious disputes. However, this still would leave us without a lower-level measure of 
internal threat. One possibility is to measure governmental violations of human rights 
(such as scored by Amnesty International); as violations go up, we would assume that 
perceived internal threat was also rising. 
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to have an additive or a stimulative effect on own-source military 
expenditures. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Replacement (i.e., substitution) behavior suggests a negatively sloped 
functional form. In addition to expecting a decrease in own-source milit- 
ary expenditures (MILEXCEN) as aid (AID) increases, we expect to see a 
decrease in the rate of substitution as AID increases. Therefore, a general 
decreasing curvilinear model (1/AID) is to be used. Since there are many 
country-years in which AID is very low, the data for U.S. aid is trans- 
formed using the natural log (In) function, so the actual estimation uses 
l/ln(AID) as the independent variable. 
With the introduction of the coefficients in the regression model, it is 
necessary to take the inverse of MILEXCEN to maintain the expected 
decreasing function. Thus, the complete equation to be estimated is: 
1/MILEXCEN = BO + Bl(l/ln(AID)) 
Remember also that the variable AID is actually the one-year lag of 
programmed aid. 
One must be aware of the boundaries of the variables. The use of the 
log inverse imposes a lower boundary of 0 for AID. Although an arithme- 
tic constraint, this boundary also serves to delineate the domain of the 
study. Since we are interested in the investigation of substitution effects, 
we are not interested in those nations that receive no aid; hence, arithme- 
tic and theoretical focus both dictate the exclusion of these nations. As for 
the dependent variable, we decided to exclude any nation that was not 
devoting at least 1 percent of its central government expenditures to the 
military. If a government was not making this minimal allocation, we felt 
that its own-source military spending would be so low as to preclude any 
ability to substitute aid for own-source spending. 
The expected impact of the control variable CONFLICT is as follows: 
if there is no war involvement (CONFLICT=O), then the substitution 
behavior is expected. If there is a war involvement (CONFLICT= 1), then 
the relationship between AID and MILEXCEN is expected to disappear 
(i.e., to become statistically insignificant), indicative of an additive fiscal 
effect. A variable more sensitive to level of threat might reveal degrees of 
variance in substitution behavior; the nominal level of the variable CON- 
FLICT cannot be expected to pick up these subtleties, but only gross 
differences in the behavior of recipient nations. 
ANALYSIS 
The plot of MILEXCEN and AID in Figure 2 confirms our expecta- 
tion of a generally-decreasing function, with a large number of cases that 
have low values on both variables. The plot justifies the use of the log 
transformation of the AID variable. 
Table 1 displays the estimation of the relationship between MILEX- 
CEN and AID. Although the overall fit is only fair, the coefficient for AID 
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TABLE 1 
PREDICTING MILEXCEN FROM AID 
Variable Coefficient T-Ratio 
Constant .005 .05 
AID 3.973 5.07 
N = 116 R-Square = .18 
is statistically significant, and its sign is consistent with our expectations. 
The coefficient is positive which, because of the form of the equation, 
indicates that as the amount of grant-in-aid goes up, the proportion of the 
recipient nation's budget that is devoted to the military goes down, a 
condition of substitution. 
Table 2 displays the estimation of the same relationship when the data 
are partitioned according to the value for the CONFLICT variable. The 
results again are consistent with our expectations. The fit for the non- 
conflict nations is better than for the entire set, while the overall fit 
indicates that there is virtually no relationship for those nations involved 
in a conflict. Further, the rate of substitution for the non-conflict nations is 
higher than that for the total set. 
TABLE 2 
PREDICTING MILEXCEN FROM AID 
CONFLICT = 0 
Variable Coefficient T-Ratio 
Constant - .112 -1.14 
AID 4.821 5.97 
N = 101 R-Square = .26 
CONFLICT = 1 
Variable Coefficient T-Ratio 
Constant .242 .75 
AID 2.614 .82 
N = 14 R-Square = .05 
We must exercise some caution when examining the results that in- 
volve only the country-years containing conflict, since the number of cases 
is so small. This might be expected to reduce the fit of the model some- 
what. The large drop in the r-square and the t-ratio of the AID variable 
that we do observe leads us to conclude that nations in conflict do not 
exhibit the substitution behavior that characterizes both the entire sample 
and the non-conflict country-years. 
The results of the second hypothesis, relating military grant-in-aid to 
health and education expenditures are presented in Table 3. For the 
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TABLE 3 
PREDICTING SOCIAL EXPENDITURES FROM AID 
HELTHCEN 
Variable Coefficient T-Ratio 
Constant .165 3.36 
AID -.010 -1.84 
N = 116 R-Square = .03 
EDCEN 
Variable Coefficient T-Ratio 
Constant .224 2.51 
AID -.003 - .30 
N = 116 R-Square = .01 
entire sample, the overall fit of both equations indicates that there is 
virtually no relationship between this form of grant-in-aid and the prop- 
ortion of the recipient government's budget devoted to these social wel- 
fare expenditures. However, note the negative sign of each regression 
coefficient for AID; these indicate that the small impact of aid is to 
increase the proportion of the budget devoted to these expenditures. 
The findings are a bit more interesting when the dataset is partitioned 
into conflict and non-conflict country-years. The results for the non- 
conflict years, as might be expected, are similar to those reported for the 
entire dataset in Table 3. The results for the conflict observations show a 
stronger relationship, but again, the small number of cases makes us wary 
of placing too much emphasis on these findings. Be that as it may, the fits 
are better; and the prediction for health expenditures is outstanding. 
Curiously, there is a substitution effect on education's proportion of the 
budget, but an additive or neutral effect for health's proportion of the 
budget. The paucity of observations for this subset make us very reluctant 
TABLE 4 
PREDICTING SOCIAL EXPENDITURES FROM AID 
CONFLICT = 0 CONFLICT = 1 
HELTHCEN HELTHCEN 
Variable Coefficient T-Ratio Variable Coefficient T-Ratio 
Constant .141 2.36 Constant .217 13.25 
AID -.007 -1.01 AID -.016 -10.86 
N = 101 R-Square = .01 N = 14 R-Square = .90 
EDCEN EDCEN 
Variable Coefficient T-Ratio Variable Coefficient T-Ratio 
Constant .254 2.34 Constant .130 2.88 
AID -.007 - .5 AiD .007 1.79 
R-Square = .01 N = 14 N = 101 R-Square = .20 
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to advance a substantive interpretation for this divergence in sign. More 
data (i.e., country years) are needed before we can draw any conclusions 
from these relationships. 
Our final hypothesis concerns the relationship between military 
grant-in-aid and the total expenditures by the recipient government. For 
this hypothesis, the results are consistent across all three partitions of the 
data (for the entire dataset, displayed in Table 5, and the non-conflict and 
conflict subsets displayed in Table 6). All three show a substitution effect, 
as high levels of military grant-in-aid are associated with low levels of total 
government expenditures. The overall fit is especially strong for the 
conflict subset; but, as before, the caution about the small number of 
observations applies. 
TABLE 5 
PREDICTING CENGVEXP FROM AID 
Variable Coefficient T-Ratio 
Constant -.005 -4.61 
AID .058 7.15 
N = 116 R-Square = .31 
TABLE 6 
PREDICTING CENGVEXP FROM AID 
CONFLICT = 0 
Variable Coefficient T-Ratio 
Constant -.005 -3.72 
AID .057 5.90 
N = 101 R-Square = .26 
CONFLICT = 1 
Variable Coefficient T-Ratio 
Constant -.006 -5.72 
AID .081 7.33 
N = 14 R-Square = .81 
DISCUSSION 
Our analysis has netted both expected and unexpected results. Con- 
sistent with our original hypothesis, MAP recipients tend to substitute 
U.S. assistance for own source monies. The rate of substitution is partial 
and considerably greater than observed in previous research (McGuire 
1979). Moreover, the expected functional form (1/Y = BO + B1(1/ 
1 n(AID))) is confirmed. The substitution of U.S. military assistance occurs 
at a decreasing rate, reflective of the inelastic demand for military goods 
and services. 
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Contrary to McGuire's findings, nations actively involved in conflict do 
not substitute U.S. aid for own source military outlays. An additive fiscal 
effect is observed. For these combatant MAP recipients, each additional 
dollar of U.S. military aid is allocated to the purchase of military goods 
and services. The variance between our findings and McGuire's may be a 
function of the country that was the object of his study - Israel. The 
threat to the national security of nations involved in conflict may be 
increased by the economic destabilization caused by the demand for 
increased military spending. These nations may seek to mute some of this 
pressure on their national budgets and economy by replacing own-source 
military outlays with MAP monies. Israel, a combatant since its birth, has 
consistently substituted between 10 and 30 percent of its MAP monies for 
own-source military spending. Israeli officials have long recognized the 
threat that large military spending represents to their national economy, 
and have sought various remedies to this problem (e.g., Bonds for Israel) 
including a replacement policy for U.S. military aid. 
There is only limited evidence to suggest that the replacement policy 
of aid recipients results in higher public sector spending for non-military 
programs (health, welfare, education). Controls for conflict produce a 
significant and positive fiscal effect between central government spending 
and aid transfers. However, these findings are suspect given the very 
small number of observations (i.e., country-years). 
The absence of a significant shift from military to non-military 
domestic spending among grant-in-aid recipients is partially accounted 
for by the negative impact aid transfers have on total recipient expendi- 
tures. The substitution of U.S. military assistance for own source spend- 
ing does not result in a shift to other domestic programs, but rather a 
decrease in total public outlays, and therefore, an increase in capital 
available to the private sector. As noted earlier, substitution effects can 
result in a reduction in revenues or an increase in transfers (loans, sub- 
sidies, etc.) to the private sector. MAP recipients appear to redistribute the 
savings realized from U.S. assistance to the private sector, expecting this 
decision will have a stronger effect on the nation's economy than in- 
creased public spending. This practice is consistent with earlier 
hypotheses. 
Uncertainty regarding the future of U.S. military assistance makes it 
difficult for MAP recipients to make long-range spending decisions based 
on current levels of U.S. funding. Aid recipients may be reluctant to 
increase domestic spending, especially for politically popular welfare and 
human resources programs when funding for these programs will likely 
have to be cut if MAP assistance is either reduced or not forthcoming. 
Shifting domestic revenues to the private sector allows for some level of 
economic stimulation without any of the political risks associated with an 
uncertain funding source for new or expanded domestic programs. 
Moreover, social and human services are much more labor intensive than 
most components of military spending (e.g., equipment procurement). 
Labor costs rise faster than capital costs, placing increased revenue de- 
mands on future national budgets. The certainty of U.S. assistance, how- 
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ever, does not increase over time, making it difficult o assume additional 
revenues (other than own source) will be available to fund new domestic 
programs and still maintain a constant level of military preparedness. 
McGuire similarly found that a significant portion of U.S. military 
assistance showed up in the private sector. Rather than devoting all 
savings from reduced military outlays to other public goods and services, 
Israeli officials cut taxes and increased transfers to private individuals and 
companies. 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study represents only an initial cut at a large area of research. 
Although we consider the findings presented herein to be sufficient o 
stand alone, there is a need to extend this research in several directions. 
First, a longer time period needs to be studied. It is particularly important 
to include more conflict country-years (and eventually, to discriminate 
between internal and external conflict involvement). At the same time, we 
would like to add an indicator of conflict hat falls below the level of war. 
We believe that the kinds of differential behavior that occur in conflict 
country-years will also appear below the war threshold. Use of such a 
variable (or variables) will also help alleviate the problem caused by the 
small number of observations. As noted earlier, we would like to expand 
our analysis to include the fiscal effects of alternative delivery mechanisms 
for U.S. military assistance (e.g., PMS, SSA, etc.). 
Sooe of the conclusions of the research presented here are a matter of 
speculation; for example, our belief that recipient nations adopt specific 
policies designed to increase capital available to the private sector. We 
intend to examine this conjecture directly (at least, as far as available data 
sources permit). Finally, the increasingly precarious international debt 
situation of many of these recipient nations may have large impacts on 
their fiscal policies; we intend to examine whether military grant-in-aid is 
related to their indebtedness and/or their budgetary response to this aid. 
To conclude, we believe that military assistance by the U.S. can have 
large, and often unanticipated, fiscal effects on the recipient nations. For 
both the policy-maker and the researcher, it is important that these 
impacts be well understood. 
REFERENCES 
Asher, Robert E. 1961. Grants, Loans and Local Currencies: Their Role in Foreign Aid. 
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. 
Benoit, E. 1978. "Growth and Defence in Developing Countries." Economic Devel- 
opment and Cultural Change 26 (anuary): 271-80. 
Chaudhuri, Ben. 1972. "International Arms Trade: The Recipient's Problem." 
Political Quarterly (July). 
Defence Security Assistance Agency (1982) Fiscal Year Series. Data Management 
Division, Comptroller. 
Deger, Saadet, and Ron Smith. 1983. "Military Expenditures and Growth in Less 
Developed Countries." Journal of Conflict Resolution 27 (June): 335-54. 
This content downloaded from 128.42.229.25 on Tue, 30 Apr 2013 15:21:59 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The U.S. Military Assistance Program 43 
Gramlich, E. 1972. "Intergovernmental Grants: a Review of the Empirical Liter- 
ature." In W. Oates, ed., The Political Economy of Fiscal Federalism, pp. 219-41. 
Lexington: D.C. Heath. 
Gutteridge, William. 1967. "The Political Role of African Armed Forces: The 
Impact of Foreign Military Assistance." African Affairs 66 (April): 63-101. 
Hammond, Paul Y., David J. Lauscher, Michael D. Sabmine, and Norman A. 
Graham. 1983. The Reluctant Supplier: U.S. Decisionmaking for Arms Sales. Cam- 
bridge, MA: OGH. 
Hughes, David. 1967. "The Myth of Military Coups and Military Assistance." 
Military Review 47 (December): 3-10. 
Kegley, Charles, and Eugene Wittkopf. 1982. American Foreign Policy: Pattern and 
Process. New York. St. Martin's. 
Kennedy, G. 1974. The Military in the Third World. London: Duckworth. 
Lerner, D. 1958. The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East. New 
York: Free Press. 
Lipset, S. 1969. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development 
and Political Legitimacy."American Political Science Review 53 (March): 65-105. 
McGuire, M. 1979. "Lump-sum Intergovernmental Grants Have Price Effects." 
In P. Mieszkowski and W. Oakland, eds., Fiscal Federalism. New York: Har- 
court, Brace, Jovanovich. 
. 1982. "U.S. Assistance, Israeli Allocation, and the Arms Race."Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 26 (June): 199-236. 
Oates, W. E. 1972. Fiscal Federalism and Grants-in-aid. Washington D.C.: Urban 
Institute. 
Pigou, A. C. 1932. The Economics of Welfare, 4th ed. London: MacMillan. 
Small, M., and J. D. Singer. 1982. Resort o Arms. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. 
Smith, Ron. 1980. "Military Expenditure and Investment in OECD Countries." 
Journal of Comparative Economics 4 (March): 19-32. 
1977. "Military Expenditure and Capitalism." Cambridge Journal of Eco- 
nomics 1 (March): 61-76. 
Stein, R. 1979. "Federal Categorical Aid: Equalization and the Application Pro- 
cess." Western Political Quarterly 32 (December): 396-408. 
.1981. "The Allocation of Federal Aid Monies: The Synthesis of Demand- 
side and Supply-side Explanations."American Political Science Review 75 (June): 
334-43. 
Whynes, D. K. 1979. The Economics of Third World Military Expenditures. London: 
MacMillan. 
Wolf, Charles. 1971. Economic Impacts of Military Assistance. Rand Report P-4578. 
Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. 
This content downloaded from 128.42.229.25 on Tue, 30 Apr 2013 15:21:59 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
